The Tug MARYLAND departed Charleston, South Carolina late on the afternoon of December 15, 1971 with the Barge BALTIMORE NO.2 made up ahead in the pushing mode. The BALTIMORE NO.2 was loaded with approximately 539 short tons of paper products, which produced a draft of about 5½ feet, freeboard of about 3 feet. The MARYLAND had refueled and filled her freshwater tanks in Charleston as was normal practice. They carried six drums of lube oil secured on the main deck aft because the installed lube oil storage capacity (200 gallons) was inadequate for the voyage. These drums were secured by laying them on their sides and using wooden wedges to hold them against the bulwark under the caprail. The drafts of the MARYLAND upon departure were approximately 7 feet forward and 9 feet aft. The voyage up the intracoastal waterway from Charleston, S.C. to the mouth of the Alligator River was uneventful. No problems with the machinery plant were noted and the radio was in normal operation.

At midnight on December 17, 1971, while proceeding north in the Alligator River the 6-hour watch was changed with the second watch consisting of the Mate, Deckhand and Assistant Engineer going on duty. At that time the Master, who had the 6:00 p.m. to 12:00 p.m. watch advised the Mate that he had received the weather report and hat the wind was forecast to shift from the northeast to the northwest during the night. At that time little could be sensed of the actual wind conditions because of the shielding effects of the woods along the river. Later, as they approached the mouth of the Alligator River the Mate observed the wind was already northwest and was getting fresh. At about 3:00 a.m. after passing through the Lindsay Warren Memorial Bridge, near the mouth of the river, the deckhand, on the Master's orders called the Master and first watch deckhand to assist in changing the tow from pushing to towing astern in preparation for crossing the open waters of Albemarle Sound. The shift was made inside the bar at the mouth of the Alligator River. During this change the Master was in control in the pilothouse and the Mate with both deckhands worked on deck changing the rig. The Tug was then brought alongside the barge and its 6-inch, 1200 foot, nylon towing hawser was shackled to the barge's towing bridle. With the tug going ahead hawser was payed out until the Master indicated by means of a whistle signal to secure it. This signal was given when about 150-200 feet of hawser has been let out upon which the Mate secured the hawser to the towing bitt, taking enough turns on the bitt to fill it up. A hawser board was put on to prevent the hawser chafing on the stern rail. The remaining hawser was coiled up on the hawser rack on the stern. When the shift evolution was completed, the Mate and the second watch deckhand resumed their normal watch. The Master and the first watch deckhand went below.

Initially, the Barge followed well and the deckhand was frequently on deck checking the adjustment of the hawser board. He recollected that at this time all deckhouse doors were closed. At about 4:00 a.m. the Tug with tow passed the river bar and proceeded out onto the open waters of the Albemarle Sound following the intracoastal waterway route toward the mouth of the North River, which would call for a course of about 023°T. Upon entering the open water the tug was met by gale-force winds from the northwest and rough seas and had to head up more toward Camden Point and the Pasquotank River, which would call for a heading of about 340°T. The Barge began to shear from side to side and the Tug began to take water on deck, in the well deck, faster than it could run off. Blowing spray was forming into ice and making the decks slippery. The Mate expressed concern to the Deckhand about the towing arrangement; that he was afraid he couldn't handle her with the barge shearing back and forth. The Deckhand offered to slack out (lengthen) the tow line but the Mate said it was too dangerous for one man. Initially, the Deckhand felt that conditions were not too bad and that if the Mate had stopped, he could have payed out more hawser. Later he noted the oil drums had come lose and were rolling around in the well deck. He notified the Mate of this condition. The Deckhand and the Mate discussed the situation for awhile. The Deckhand recalled the Mate saying. "I don't see why in the hell he don't get up and come up here, I know he's not staying in the bed," he said, "and I'm scared of it." In spite of his concern the Mate did not have the Deckhand call the Master or otherwise make his concern know to the Master. The Tug continued into Albemarle Sound at slow ahead, just holding her own.

At about 6:00 a.m. the Master and first watch Deckhand came on deck to relieve the watch. After surveying the situation, the Master stopped the Tug to pay out more hawser. However, the loose drums rolling around in the well deck made it impossible for the crew to safely reach the towing bitt and hawser. Meanwhile, the wind and sea had moved the barge around and out of line with the tug. This pulled her down aft heeling to starboard initially. The Master tried to go ahead to again bring the tug in line with the barge. The Master tried to start the engine but it did not start. The Chief Engineer came into the pilothouse and discussed the situation with the Master. The Chief Engineer wanted to cut the barge loose; the Master wanted to keep the barge. Meanwhile the Tug continued to be pulled down aft, alternately heeling to starboard then to port. The Chief Engineer went below again. Shortly thereafter the Master told the second watch Deckhand to go to the engine room to see if he could help. He proceeded along the starboard side of the main deck and entered engine room from the main deck. He found the Chief Engineer and the Assistant Engineer attempting without success to start a portable gasoline bilge pump that was carried for dewatering barges. Water appeared to be entering the engine room from the after part of the vessel, but he could not see where it was coming from. The Deckhand did not recall the water level as being above the deck grating. He did observe that the door to the shaft alley was open and he thought the vessel's lights were still on; also he heard a generator still running. Shortly after the Deckhand arrived in the engine room the Master appeared and stated that the radio would not work. No distress broadcast had been or could be made. The Deckhand did not notice when the lights went out as it was becoming daylight.

The GEORGETTA returned to the body first sighted and tried to retrieve it with boat hooks but could not due to the minimum of six foot freeboard on that yacht. Hastings secured efforts to recover the body afraid he would rip off the life preserver and cause the body to sink.

A Coast Guard helicopter from the Elizabeth City Air Station was on scene at 9:35 a.m. and at 9:45 a.m. lifted the survivor from the GEORGETTA and transported him to Albemarle Hospital in Elizabeth City. During the time the helicopter was gone the GEORGETTA continued to search concentrating downwind of the tug and barge, At about 10"30 a.m. the barge broke free of the tug and began drifting to the southeast.

At about 12:50 p.m. the Coast Guard Patrol Boat CG-30475 from Light Attendant Station, Coinjock, NC arrived and joined the search. It was directed toward the know body by the GEORGETTA and recovered it. The body was identified as that of the Master.

The Coast Guard air and sea search for the missing men was continued through 21 December 1971 without success. At that time active search was suspended. Periodic searches, searches during other activities, and searches by local law enforcement agencies along the surrounding beaches continued until all bodies were recovered on 11 January 1972. Six souls were lost.

CONCLUSIONS

A United States Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation Report was released on 11 July 1974. The major conclusions were as follows:

1. The casualty was caused by the failure of the Master to cut the barge adrift. Had the towline been cut at any time during the significant time period which elapsed between the unsuccessful efforts to restart the tug's engine and the point where progressive flooding would have resulted in capsizing even without the tripping force of the tow, the tug could have remained afloat. Relieved of the tripping and stern pull-down forces of the wind-driven tow, the initial flooding could have been controlled. The reluctance of the Master to cut free the barge must e attributed to psychological factors related to the traditional blemish on the record of a master who abandons his tow.

2. The failure of the engine to restart after initial efforts to pay out the towing hawser were abandoned was caused by fouling of the propeller by the towing hawser. A bight of the end of the hawser, initially stowed on the well deck hawser grating was washed overboard through the aftermost starboard freeing port at some time after leaving the mouth of the Alligator River and encountering heavy weather but prior to stopping the vessel to lengthen the hawser. When stopped, the drift of the tug caused the bight of trailing towline to tend under the tug in way of the propeller where it became fouled in the propeller when the direct driven diesel engine was cranked over for starting. Succeeding turns collected around th propeller shaft, between the propeller and stern frame until sufficient restraining force developed to prevent further cranking of the engine. Without propulsion the tug was towed stern first, heeling alternately to one side or the other, by the still attached wind-driven barge. This towing action typically pulled the stern down and under. Flooding initially occurred through the loose or open scuttle to the lazarette space thus further submerging the stern. Simultaneously, or shortly thereafter, water began to enter the machinery space through loosely closed portholes and weather deck doors opened during the aborted towline lengthening operation. Although initial flooding of the engine room was slow, electrical power was lost almost immediately. The initial entry of water must therefore have grounded out the switchboard rendering the electric bilge pump, radio and other essential electrical equipment inoperative. Without propulsion or electrical power and with the tripping of the stern pull-down forces of the towline still in effect, flooding of the machinery space progressed at an increasing rate until insufficient stability remained to resist capsizing forces of the wind and tow. The tug finally laid on her side but still afloat. In this position she experienced rapid flooding of other spaces, finally setting to the bottom in a more or less upright position with the barge still attached by the towline slowly dragging her over the bottom until chafing action parted the towline.

1. The sole survivor was John S. Williams, Deckhand, holder of a Merchant Mariner's Document endorsed for Ordinary Seaman, Food Handler. As a result of the casualty, he was hospitalized for four days for treatment of exposure.

2. Name of Vessel MARYLAND Official Number 279563 Service Towing Gross Tons 166 Net Tons 89 Length 96.2 feet Breadth 22.0 feet Depth 8.8 feet Propulsion Diesel/Single Screw Horsepower 690 Home Port Norfolk, Virginia

3. Document Source for this article:
   Marine Casualty Report:
   FOUNDERING OF THE M/V MARYLAND
   IN ALBEMARLE SOUND, NORTH CAROLINA
   ON 18 DECEMBER 1971 WITH LOSS OF LIFE

   U.S. COAST GUARD
   MARINE BOARD OF INVESTIGATION REPORT
   RELEASED 11 JULY 1974

4. Images Provided Courtesy of:
   WAFF CONTRACTING, INC.
   PO Box 237
   Edenton, NC 27932
   (252) 482-7071
   info@waffcontracting.com
   http://www.waffcontracting.com

RAI / 02 June 2010